Summary: Over the course of about two centuries, the population of Ancient Spartan full citizens -homoioi -declined precipitously. Historians typically ascribe structural, social and economic causes to this decline. In what follows, I use sample statistics to argue that despite scant evidence, the attrition rate suffered by Spartan armies on the battlefield was enough to intensify or cause the enormous population decline.
Introduction
It is well established that over the course of the sixth, fifth, and fourth centuries, the population of Spartan homoioi (‚equals', ‚peers', or full citizens) decreased significantly. According to Herodotus through Demeratus, there were some 8,000 homoioi in the sixth century.1 Aristotle in turn suggests there were once about 10,000 full citizens in Sparta, a claim supported by Plutarch.2 Sparta did not appear stingy with the use of its citizen power in the sixth and early fifth century. Before the Persian Wars, Sparta sent a sizeable force of citizens to assault the distant island of Samos in the mid sixth century at considerable risk.3 Later that century, Sparta dispatched another large force described as ‚Spartiates' under Dorieus to colonize Western lands; the Spartan army at Plataea in 479 BC was composed of 5,000 homoioi.4 And yet some seventy years later, Sparta's citizen population had decreased such that they sued for peace with Athens in 425 BC over the potential loss of just 120 citizens!5 By the disastrous battle of Leuctra in 371 BC, the total number of homoioi had dropped to about 1,000.6
Modern historical research attempting to track the changing size of the homoioi has steadily become more precise in its calculations. Grundy's work (1908) was to an extent a response to Beloch's demographic research on the population of ancient Greece (1886), which Beloch estimated at 2.2 million (compared to modern estimates of 8-10 million).7 Grundy makes several deductions and develops various proportions to reach a total population of homoioi. He argues that the population of Greece in ancient times was larger than that of his present (early 1900s) , that the modern population of Lacedaemon was likely smaller but comparable to the ancient population of Lacedaemon, and that the 5,000 homoioi sent to Plataea (479 BC) represented the entire able-bodied male population between 20 and 50 years of age, and 40 % of the total male population. From these relationships, Grundy believes the total population of homoioi stood at 12,500 in the early 5 th century and decreased over time.8 Though his decision to rebuke Beloch's study of ancient Greek demography was valiant and useful, Grundy's approximate total population of homoioi was hugely optimistic and not particularly detailed, nor was it the ultimate focus of his work. Hansen recently published "The Shotgun Method: The Demography of the Ancient Greek City-State Culture" (2008) to entirely revamp the demographic study of the Ancient Greek world 120 years after Beloch. While groundbreaking as a demographic piece, "The Shotgun Method" does not directly impact our knowledge of the numbers of homoioi for three major reasons: first, the populations tend to rely upon intramural areas and known territory sizes, the former of which is difficult to approximate with Sparta because Sparta was unfortified throughout the archaic and classical era and was notoriously comparatively barren.9 Second, "The Shotgun Method" seeks the number of Greeks "in the age of Alexander", which is slightly past the period in question.10 Third, the estimated population of Sparta includes its various social classes, and does not isolate the population of homoioi, which is what we seek to study. Because general demographic works are not perfectly applicable to Sparta, a more particular study focused on the Spartan population is requisite.
Paul Cartledge does not attempt to determine the number of homoioi over time, but relies upon Cavaignac's deductions in "La population du Péloponnèse aux V e et IV e siècles" (1912) , which was partly written in response to Beloch's study in light of new information in the form of Theompompus. Cavaignac built his argument upon a close reading of the Spartan military organization over several pivotal moments, estimates of agricultural output and resulting population numbers; he compared these figures with other contemporary Greek armies ( fig. 1 ).11
Fig. 1: Various views of homoioi populations and decline12
The most complete study of the homoioi population capable of bearing arms from 479 to 362 BC was by Figueira. He not only analyzed the population as it related to the campaigns of Plataea (479), Mantinea (418) , and Leuctra (371) like Cavaignac, but estimated its size at five other junctures.13 He applied a pertinent ‚model life 11 Cavaignac 1912, 261 ff. 12 Sourced from Grundy 1908, 81; Cartledge 2000 , 38 after Cavaignac 1912 Cawkwell 1983, 390; Hansen 2009, 394 . 13 Figueira 1986, 165: "A[n] [army] reorganization during the Pentecontaetia, during the Pylos campaign, for another reorganization c. 400, at the Battle of the Nemea River, and during the 360s." Post-Leuctra 876 To explain the decline of the Spartan citizenry, Aristotle notes in the "Criticism of the Spartan Constitution" that unfortunate socioeconomic structural fallacies were detrimental to the population growth of Sparta; in spite of the amount of land which should have been enough to maintain a massive population. He states: "[…] although the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers, they numbered not even a thousand. And the defective nature of their system of land-tenure has been proved by the actual facts of history: the state did not succeed in enduring a single blow, but perished owing to the smallness of its population."15 While this single-blow undoubtedly referred to Leuctra where 400 homoioi fell, the discussions of longterm causes of the manpower shortage leading up to Leuctra tend to follow in the wake of Aristotle's perception. Writing generations after that battle, Aristotle argued that landed estates became fragmented, which prevented Spartan men from preserving the wealth necessary to be considered full citizens. He believes that Spartan land was unequally distributed because of its inheritance laws, the lack of structural incentives to increase birthrates, and the cultural impossibility of enfranchising outsiders. Spartan women also played a pivotal role in the degeneration of property ownership: Aristotle claims that though Spartan laws made it dishonorable to sell an estate, it was legal to give away land through gifts or bequests; because of dowries and inheritances, nearly two-fifths of the country ended up owned by women (who could not be homoioi). 16 In summation, Aristotle argued that the decline in citizen population -so called oliganthrôpia -was caused by Spartan structural fallacies. Together, Xenophon, Isocrates, Ephorus, Plato, and other fourth century writers blame socioeconomic factors for the decline of Sparta during its period of hegemony. They also suggest that the influx of foreign capital at the end of the Peloponnesian war caused insurmountable problems or forced changes in Spartan society.17 Historians who discuss oliganthrôpia tend to follow the arguments set forth by ancient writers. Connected were the cultural and economic impacts of the wars of the fifth century which placed Spartans in contact with large amounts of gold and silver. These assets in turn accelerated the process of wealth disparity.18 Past scholars have discounted infertility as the cause of the decline due to the high rate of decline, the presence of hypomeiones and nothoi, and that the population was too large to suffer from the demographic downsides of inbreeding. Scholars have also explored whether the earthquake of 464 BC in which "more than twenty thousand Lacedaemonians perished" (Diod. XI.63.1) and the Helot revolt which followed could have caused the long term decline of the population of homoioi.19 After extensive discussion, researchers conclude that though Sparta's population was damaged, it somewhat recovered, and these two events could not entirely cause long-term population decline.20 Nevertheless, the earthquake may have had a long-term impact on land distribution and caused a short-term increase in mortality which may have resulted in lasting issues in Spartan society.21 This hypothesis will be brought up again at the end of this article. The argument has focused on the system on land-tenure and the unequal distribution of property; more and more homoioi were unable to pay their share of the messes and had to drop out.22 Though there have been numerous discussions of the population of homoioi over the past centuries,23 we showcase several historians' approach to the explanation of oliganthrôpia.
An alternative explanation has been provided by Chrimes, who believes that Aristotle is misguided about the number of homoioi because he is mistaken in his interpretation of the term Spartiatai.24 Chrimes finds evidence of the presence of a large male population in the campaigns which followed Leuctra, notably against Arcadia in 367 and Egypt in 362. Chrimes suggests that the term Spartiatae had different definitions to different authors. To Xenophon, Chrimes argues, Spartiatae "denote[s] a class of Spartan citizens with higher privileges than the rest", an office holding class; while to other authors -notably Herodotus -Spartiatae simply means citizens.25 By this argument, a total citizen population of 6,000-7,000 existed in Ancient Sparta in 397 BC. The supposed oliganthrôpia was nothing more than an etymological error! While ancient authors used the term Spartiatai in a broad and narrow sense, denoting either all members of the Spartan polis by birth, or just Spartans who enjoyed full political rights, the manner in which 19 Hansen 2009 , 394. 20 French 1955 "No further land fighting [after the battle of Tanagra] with the forces of Sparta occurred before the truce and peace. The signing of the truce may itself be considered a recognition that Sparta was strong and revived and herself again." See also Figueira 1986, 82 : "Therefore, it can be accepted that Sparta's population recovered somewhat after the Earthquake/Revolt." 21 Hodkinson 2009, 236; Wrigley 1978 , 135 ff. 22 Cawkwell 1983 , 388. 23 See: Beloch 1886 Busolt 1905, 387 ff.; Cartledge 1979; Cawkwell 1983; Lazenby 1985; Scott 2011 , 24 ff. 24 Chrimes 1949 . Though in this paper we use the term homoioi to denote full Spartan citizens, the term Spartiatai can also be used. I did not do so to avoid the potential uncertainty of the term. 25 Chrimes 1949, 351; 354. both Aristotle and Xenophon use the term is in the narrow sense and it is quite clear that there were too few ‚Spartiatai' to fully man the four moirai deployed at Leuctra.26 An interpretation of nomenclature in the sources aside, historians turn to discussing the structural causes of oliganthrôpia.
Participation in the syssitia was a requisite of membership in the homoioi. Without land to produce the income necessary to contribute to the syssitia, contribution was impossible. Due to this requirement, the idea that patterns in land ownership and productivity drove the decline of the population of citizens has therefore become the basis of explaining oliganthrôpia. In Sparta's archaic history, presumably, the state assigned klêros to each male who successfully passed the agôgê. Klêroi were reassigned at their holders' death.27 At some point in the fifth century, the Spartans switched to a system of direct inheritance.28 In the mid fifth century, many klêroi lost their owners, due perhaps to the earthquake of 464, and were parceled out to the remaining population of homoioi, rather than being held in stock and gradually assigned to males as they graduated the agôgê. At the same time, losses in the population of helots -due to the earthquake, revolt(s), and the Peloponnesian War -lowered the productivity of kleroi. Owning multiple kleroi mitigated against the reduction of agricultural productivity. The system of inheritance rapidly created difficulties in maintaining proper distribution of property, and some Spartans found themselves born without enough property and unable to marry into land. Sometime in the late 5 th century, the rhetra -which allowed free bequest and grant of klêros land sans restriction -was passed at Sparta, perhaps to allow land to be given by the rich to the poor and restore some equality. That didn't seem to work, and the rhetra is instead portrayed by ancient writers as a method for the rich to acquire additional land from the poor!29
Historians such as Hodkinson, Figueira, and Cartledge argue that land became concentrated under the control of a few wealthy families at the expense 26 Hawkins 2011, 405; Lazenby 1985, 19 . 27 For the argument that the state dominated the schema of land tenure and inheritance, see for example: Oliva 1971, 32 ff.; 48 ff., and 188 ff. Forrest 1980, 135 ff.; Figueira 1984, 87 ff.; Ziehen 1933, pp. 218 ff.; Busolt -Swoboda 1926, 633 ff.; Hooker 1980, 116 ff. ; On the problems with the evidence, see Hodkinson 1986, Section 1, 378 ff. and 393-394. 28 Stephen Hodkinson persuasively suggested that the system of land tenure was not dominated by the state, whereby estates were reverted to the state upon the citizen's death in various ways, as had been previously suggested based on problematic evidence, but rather "a system which was pre-eminently one of private estates transmitted by partible inheritance and diverging devolution and open to alienation through lifetime gifts, testamentary bequests and betrothal of heiresses." Hodkinson 1986, 404. 29 Figueira 1986, 171; 184-185; 193-195. of the rest of the population of homoioi. Over time, the land that served as the basis for the maintenance of a population of homoioi was acquired by the richer classes through marriage patterns of the rich -notably homogamy, wife sharing, and uterine half-sibling marriage -where landholdings were maintained in a close-knit network of wealthy families meanwhile, partible inheritance ensured that the majority of families owned smaller holdings than their ancestors. After the Peloponnesian War, well-placed Spartans could obtain foreign commands which could be enormously lucrative -the spoils of which could be used to acquire additional property at home at the expense of poorer citizens.30
Along the same lines, Ephraim David argues that the economic and social equilibrium of Sparta was damaged by the inflow of foreign capital into private hands. As restrictions on the transfer of estates were removed and wealth flowed into the hands of the few, individual citizens were able to accumulate more and more property, leaving the rest of the population without the basic land to qualify as homoioi.31 This argument implies that oliganthrôpia should have begun in the late or post Peloponnesian War period, yet the Spartan population of homoioi had already been in a state of decline since the 500s (see fig. 1 ).
Lazenby discounts "factors which should have been relatively constant, like the possible effects of sexual practices or the division of estates between several sons and daughters … [and] actual losses sustained by the Spartiates, for example in the earthquake of c.465, or the constant warfare from the 460's onwards."32 Instead, he points to the short and long term economic implications of warfare on the helot population. Helots were lost due to Athenian actions such as the base in Laconia which provided refuge for helots (Thuc. VII.26.2), and called up during the innumerable Spartan campaigns to serve as hoplites, light infantry, rowers, and laborers. With a reduced or missing servile population, Spartans were unable to generate the income necessary to pay for the syssitia. From the 460s onwards and particularly from 431, the number of Spartiates declined; the poor were unable to recover economically and their land was eventually passed to the wealthy -precipitated by the influx of wealth into Sparta after winning the Peloponnesian War.33 Figueira 1986, 171 ff. One notable fallacy in this argument stems from the lack of evidence of marriage patterns of the poor. If the rich could marry in clever ways to maintain their property in spite of partible inheritance, why couldn't the slightly poorer citizens do so as well? 31 David 1981, 57-59; 66. 32 Lazenby 1985 , 58. 33 Lazenby 1985 Though the population of helots was doubtlessly stressed by war, it is also possible that it regenerated from its losses organically. According to Grundy, the proportion of homoioi to Helot was no lesser than 1:15 in fifth century Messenia and Laconia.34 By the fourth century, a dwindling population of homoioi would have further imbalanced this ratio. If Lazenby believes the population of homoioi could have rebounded from short-term losses, surely the larger population of helots could have as well. Along this same argument, the evidence used by Lazenby to suggest a drainage of the population of helots could instead be a symptom of comparative over population -that there were in fact too many helots and they could readily be spared for additional duties, slaughtered directly, or used as proverbial cannon fodder in the direct aims of reducing their total population. 35 Consolidating much of the structural arguments, Figueira states: "The rigidities associated with the agôgê, messes, and dues necessitated that each generation of homoioi closely duplicates its predecessor. Mechanisms for redistributing property broke down in the midst of the economic crisis brought on by the war with the Athenians."36 While these arguments are entirely believable, there are five reasons why the structural argument is limited. First, the rate of decline is quite precipitous at several moments which lead me to believe that structural causes cannot entirely account for oliganthrôpia. The unequal spread of property would certainly hamper the replenishment of Sparta's army, but not directly lead to immediate major losses. How then can we explain such massive declines as that of 600 fighting age homoioi in just seven years between 425 and 418 BC?
Second, the structural argument suggests that since fertility did not change, the population of disenfranchised homoioi -hypomeiones -should have increased somewhat in proportion to the decrease of homoioi. As the rich consolidated smaller plots of land, all those landholders should theoretically have become hypomeiones. Problematically however, the term hypomeiones is only attested to once in primary sources,37 and total numbers of hypomeiones can only be inferred from anecdotal evidence such as Cinadon's conspiracy, the restive plots put down by Agesilaos during the invasion of Lacedaemon in 370/369 BC, and Phylarchos' discussion of Spartan mothakes enrolled in the paideia (whereby hypomeiones are assumed to be part of the mothakes).38 Surely a massive demographic social change whereby "hypomeiones were being recruited into the moirai in the fourth 34 Grundy 1908 , 81. 35 Jordan 1990 , 54. 36 Figueira 1986 . 37 Xen. hell. III.3.6. 38 Hawkins 2011, 422-423. century at a ratio approaching 2 or 2.5 for every full Spartan citizen"39 would not have gone unnoticed by curious writers across Greece (such as Aristotle), especially since the Spartan army of the fourth century ventured outside of Lacedaemon quite often. If so many hypomeiones were dissatisfied with their lots in life, as perhaps implied by Cinadon's conspiracy, wouldn't the dramatic rise of hypomeiones, rather than just the decline of homoioi, have merited some discussion by ancient scholars?
Third, if indeed the rich were gathering land to the detriment of the poor, would they not have understood that it rendered them vulnerable to internal (from the restive helots or hypothetical disenfranchised hypomeiones) and external (such as Athens) threats to the Spartan way of life, and therefore undertake programs to sponsor hypomeiones or even mothakes to regain citizen status? Hodkison suggests the possibility that some homoioi provided assistance to their messmates who could not afford to pay for their mess contributions.40 Such a move would also be beneficial to these homoioi with resources to spare as they would gain a following of loyal patrons and prestige -which is more useful in maintaining political power than the creation of lavish self-aggrandizing sculptures and dedications, evidenced by the high profile behavior of Lysander, Hieron, Spartan winners at the Olympic chariot races, Agis, and the derisory comments made by Agesilaus II on these dedications.41 It is notable that instead of addressing issues related to land ownership, the polis introduced two measures to improve longterm numbers. First, having three sons meant that the father became exempt from military service, while having four sons made him exempt from all public services.42 Second, the polis changed the regulations of marriage such that men were required to marry before late adulthood and procreate. Before, Spartan males were restricted in their roles as husbands as they could not live with their wives and spent little time with them until they were around thirty -which made it undoubtedly more difficult to reproduce.43 Though the date of these reforms is not agreed upon, it is possible that they coincided with the military reforms of the mid-fifth century when the polis officially recognized the declining numbers of homoioi.44 Rather than treating the result of the problem, which would be the 44 Hodkinson 2009, 240-241; Daube 1977; Cartledge 1979, 309-310; Sallares 1991, 171; MacDowell 1986, 76 argue for an earlier date based on theoretical discussions of social entities.
case if the problem were structural, the initiatives of the polis may therefore have been directly trying to counter the population losses suffered in war.
Fourth is that we are largely dependent on our ancient sources when making the structural argument -sources which often moralize and are prone to their culture's biases. Greeks tended to believe that the present was the result of a fall from a more perfect past.45 In seeking explanations for their decline, both classical writers and the Spartans themselves may have argued that a period of unscrupulous imperial expansion caused their downfall.46 Further, Greeks also thought military defeats were caused by moral weakness. It is almost too easy to blame Sparta's seemingly extraordinary military collapse due to the corruption of its supposedly egalitarian and austere practices.47 The creation of empire and concentration of wealth by the rich fits perfectly in this moral tradition.
Fifth and finally, major population changes do not necessarily have to be ascribed to one specific trend, but can be correlated to other trends in a feedback loop. That homoioi died in combat and that their replenishment rate decreased for structural reasons are not mutually exclusive hypotheses. Additionally, even in today's era of artificial intelligence and big data -it is not very easy to decipher causes for major trends and events, and especially difficult to tease out the differences between correlation and causation. It is therefore possible that the ancients may also have noticed the former rather than the latter.
In what follows I argue that oliganthrôpia was highly affected by deaths in conflicts, rather than solely due to the structural causes discussed by Aristotle. I do not suggest Aristotle is in any way incorrect, but that the manpower loss caused by the seemingly unending conflicts over the nearly 200-year period also contributed heavily to the total population decline of homoioi. That casualties in battle had a major impact on ancient populations is a generally accepted point; what is novel in this argument are the specific numbers displayed in this paper which suggest that casualties in warfare were possibly the main reason why the population of homoioi decreased substantially. To construct this argument, I built a multi-limbed proportion of deaths per conflict model. I used two major pieces of data: a data set assembled and presented in this paper and the proportions found by Peter Krentz in his study on casualties in hoplite battles. I made several assumptions, clearly described in the following section. Three distinct paths were followed to approximate total deaths described respectively as Model 1, 2 and 3. In the first, I performed basic statistical tests on Krentz' ratios, and applied the 45 Redfield 1977, 147. 46 Powell -Hodkinson 1994, 101 for a greater discussion on this topic. 47 Flower -Toher 1991, 93-94; Redfield 1985, 109-118; Austin, in J. Rich -G. Shipley (eds.) 1993, 208-212; Powell -Hodkinson 1994, 96. average to the dataset. In the second, I applied the range of Krentz' ratios to the dataset to yield a different approximation of Spartan deaths. In the third model, a variable rate is applied using a dynamic formula to calculate losses based on the army sizes provided by Figueira's research. These totals are then discussed in light of the existing knowledge about the Spartan population to show that a steady attrition rate had a dramatic impact on the total Spartan population. At all times, I take a conservative approach in my models, and the resulting death count is likely less than what was actually suffered by Sparta. A follow up article incorporating available specific data of losses and more aggressive modeling may be a fruitful endeavor for future research.
Such a narrative for Sparta's citizen decline as a result of warfare is not without direct precedent in Greek history. Between 480 and 371 BC for example, the Thespian hoplite population was obliterated through several disastrous engagements. Despite once being the second largest city in Boeotia and a prominent rival of Thebes, the major battles of Thermopylae (480), Plataea (479), Delion (424), and Nemea (394) destroyed the hoplite population. Today, nothing remains of Thespiai.48
Model 1 and Model 2 Methodology
The greatest obstacle to this argument is the lack of direct information about Spartan battlefield losses. Ancient writers did not typically note the number of deaths suffered in each conflict, and when they did those figures are often suspect. At the battle of Plataea for example, Herodotus reports only 159 allied Greek deaths,49 which seems low for such a massive engagement, particularly considering that the allied army was opposed to a large and well-equipped army fielded by the world's greatest empire.50 That figure is also suspicious when taking other claims into account, notably Plutarch and Diodorus who both report much higher death counts.51 What we have instead are more believable, more precise figures from various authors for several battles. In his study "Casualties in Hoplite Battles", Peter Krentz establishes general percentages of deaths for hoplite armies engaged in battle from those assorted battles. If we assume that the percentage of battlefield deaths are a sample of the broader population of total percentage of battlefield deaths, and that the sample is representative of that broader population in a manner which relates to Sparta, then we can apply Peter Krentz' findings to deduce the general number of Spartan deaths.
The percentage deaths suffered by winners and losers was between 2 % and 10 % of a force for a victorious army, and between 3 % and 20 % for a defeated force. Krentz' lack of any exact information we shall be conservative and assume that half of battle percentages were lost, meaning a victorious army lost between 1 % and 5 % of its force, and a defeated army lost between 2 % and 10 % of its force. The broader ‚population' of conflicts is chosen and filtered through specific criteria: 1. Time period: Given the lack of specific and accurate information about campaigns from authors writing about events before those discussed by Herodotus (i. e. Pausanias, Plutarch, Tyrtaeus). The possible time period ends with the battle of Chaeronea (338 BC) because there is little information on the remaining homoioi by then, and the dynamics of warfare and politics changed drastically under Macedonian hegemony. Campaigns are extracted from Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Diodorus. 2. Land battles: Only land battles will be counted so as to fit the sample percentages to relevant conflicts and because the total number of homoioi in naval forces was limited. 3. Definition of a campaign and their inclusion: Campaigns are defined as voluntary, state approved, armed expeditions with a purpose, with a definite beginning and end. As de Ste. Croix wrote: "[…] the shift from stock-raising to arable farming determined thereafter the general pattern of warfare on land, for the basic objectives everywhere in this game of ‚agricultural poker' became the menacing, temporary possession or destruction of the enemy's crops and the protection of one's own."55 Campaigns of these agricultural societies are counted only if they fit a particular type: those which aim to defeat an enemy army, and those aiming to capture a territory. Other military actions, such as those which sought to support allies or ravage territory are not counted to be conservative about total deaths, to simplify the data presented, and because of lack of information about associated deaths. The goal of a campaign is not based on its various possible causes, but upon the direct objective of the action that defines the campaign in question. I backtrack the goal of the campaign from the action which actually materialized. For example, the allied Greek armies at Plataea in 479 BC attempted to destroy Mardonius' Persian army. Thus, the goal of the Spartan and Athenian forces during the campaign of Plataea was to defeat the Persian army. I am using goals or purposes of an army in a strict sense based on the immediate action attempted. 4. Success: Often noting the success or failure of a campaign is quite simple: did the army accomplish its objective, or did it not? In some cases, the question of victory is more debatable. What if the goal was to conquer a location, and the army ravaged the land and returned home without major losses? Should this be labeled a defeat because the objective was not accomplished? The army inflicted damage upon the enemy that could conceivably lead to an end to the war, a strategy employed by Sparta in such campaigns as that of 389 BC against Acarnania. A compromise must be reached: the campaign will simply be marked as inconclusive. 5. Number of men and segmentations: The numbers of men cited was the most difficult metric, and there are several factors that had to be overcome to provide a general approximation of numbers. First, the number of men can be completely implausible, as was discussed with Herodotus' approximation of the invading Persian armies during the Persian Wars. Second, there are times when numbers are simply not known. Third, the status of fighting men was sometimes difficult to interpret. For example, should helots in the Spartan army at the battle of Plataea be treated as combatants or not? This specific question was discussed in Peter Hunt's article "Helots at the Battle of Plataea" extensively,56 to the tune of yes, these helots should be treated as combatants. I attempt to circumvent this issue by segmenting armies by approximate sizes, while focusing solely on the population of homoioi present.
We deal with these difficulties by developing a process in order to mark armies that are small with a 1, medium armies with a 2, and large armies with a 3. First we must overcome the aforementioned difficulties. For implausible figures, we cross-reference sources and look to secondary research for guidance. When numbers are simply not known, we make logical assumptions where we can. To elaborate on ‚logical assumptions', though we do not know the size of the Spartan force taking part in Archidamus' invasion of Arcadia in 367 BC, we can assume based on the scale of the war, the levy of the ‚citizen army', and the potential risk the war represented to Sparta, that the size of the force was quite large in proportion to the total army Sparta could muster. For forces which include both land based and naval forces, such as the Spartan force which supported Syracuse in 414 BC, we only count the land component of such a force. Determining the size of armies deployed by Sparta depends on whether we have total numbers or if we are given a number regiments of homoioi. We shall assume that each Spartan regiment contained 500 men, in accordance with Diodorus' statement (XV.32.1). If regiments, we split small armies to between 0 and 1,000 men or approximations of small forces such as the Spartan expedition to Abydos (Thuc. VIII.61). Medium sized armies are between 1,000 and 2,500 men, or approximations of medium-sized armies. Large armies boast over 2,500 men, or approximations of large-sized armies such as the Spartan deployment at Mantinea (Xen. VII.5.10). We chose these cut-off points because when the Spartan army was deployed during the war with Thebes, the total Spartan contingent included about 5 regiments and one regiment of Sciritae to yield approximately 3,100 men. Armies slightly smaller than this are also quite large, and we wanted to encompass the large-scale deployments of Spartan power. A careful reader would note that armies under Spartan command were often far larger than 3,100 men, due to the use of perioikoi, helots, neodamodeis, mercenaries, and allies. In the cases when the total forces of Lacedaemonians -rather than homoioi are provided, but we know there were homoioi present -another set of cut-offs applies: small armies would be between 0 and 1,500, medium between 1,500 through 5,000, and large armies greater than 5,000. The number of homoioi present would be backtracked from the size of the armies to synchronize with the previous methodology based on the number of homoioi present ( fig. 3 ).
Armies Solely Homoioi
Small (1) Medium (2) Large (3) If armies are denoted by homoioi, otherwise the ‚Total' rate applies.
-1,000 1,000-2,500 >2,500
Total 0-1,500 1,500-5,000 >5,000
Fig. 3: Simplified key to breakdown of sizes
A number is accorded to the relevant size. A small force is accorded the number 1, a medium the number 2, and large the number 3. By codifying sizes as numbers, statistical tests on the relationships between sizes and other quantifiable variables can be performed. These are not ‚hard' cutoffs, the point is to estimate the relative size of armies deployed. Were the armies very large or very small or in between? We are trying to approximate these, given imperfect information, which is why we cannot simply look at the direct numbers of men -especially since there are so many holes in knowledge and disputes about exact numbers. But nobody can dispute that the Spartan deployment at Plataea in 479 BC was very large. Any relevant reinforcements which fought in the campaign are added to the total assets utilized to conduct the campaign to approximate army size. I finish the sample at Mantineia because Sparta was nearly wiped out by the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea and most of the population of homoioi disappeared before and during those battles. Lastly, I filter out the conflicts in which we do not conclusively know that homoioi were present, yielding the following and final sample population of conflicts (tab. 
Model 1: Approximate Deaths From the Mean of Ratios
In this model, I perform several statistical tests on Peter Krentz' sample, and apply the resulting ratios to the larger Spartan data set. The following are the summary statistics for Krentz' sample set, assuming a t-distribution to the data set. The bottom three coefficients reflect the relative lack of skewness of the sample, allowing a t-distribution to apply (tab. 4 and see Appendix 5 for relevant formulas).57 With 90 % certainty, for winning armies the average ratio of losses was between 3.89 % and 6.07 %, and losing armies lost an average between 11.62 % and 15.43 % of their total. As mentioned above, though campaigns aimed at conquering a location likely had similar casualty ratios, we shall halve the battle ratios, but assume the same distribution such that the confidence interval is identical. Let us, in turn, apply the averages to the Spartan armies fielded. To be methodical and conservative, let us choose only larger forces, forces of size 2 or 3, and assume that medium armies are composed of 1,750 homoioi (the midpoint between 1,000 and 2,500) and large armies are composed of 2,500 homoioi. For sizes which could be either medium or large, we shall assume the former to be conservative. Let us also assume inconclusive battles (i. e. the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC) yield a ‚victory' ratio of losses to reduce total losses. From the data set of Spartan campaigns, the following are the segmented number of campaigns (tab. 5):
Tab. 5: Segmented number of campaigns
So, out of the 22 campaigns which aimed to conquer a location, 5 were conducted using medium armies and 15 using large armies. 2 medium armies succeeded, and 3 were defeated. 13 large armies succeeded, 2 failed.
We then apply the ratios derived from the statistical tests performed above to segmentations of the data set. The design below shows the number of homoioi given army size, which must then be multiplied by the associated percentage losses assuming a victory or a defeat, then multiplied again by the associated number of samples in the data set to reach the total number of homoioi lost in the sample set. To elucidate with an example, a ‚medium' army of 1,750 homoioi that successfully conquered a location lost 2.5 % of its total force, and there were 2 instances of medium armies successfully conquering a location. Thus, the total number of homoioi lost was 87 for that segment (tab. 6). The sum of the losses is 3,466. When applying the 90 % confidence interval displayed above to the win/lose ratios yields a range of 2,788 and 4,008 deaths.58
Model 2: Approximate Deaths From the Range of Ratios
In this section, I attempt to reach an approximate number of deaths from the range of ratios. Instead of applying averages, I utilize both the range from the army segmentations and the range of ratios lost. The outcome from this approach is somewhat comparable to that reached in Model 1. Once again, I segment the campaigns based on their goals. I then break down the armies taking part in the campaign as medium or large in terms of the homoioi that would constitute the army. I do not include small armies. Medium armies can be either upper bound in numbers -2,500 homoioi, or lower bound -1,500 homoioi. To be conservative, large armies can only be at their lowest bound: 2,500 homoioi. The range of losses is then applied. I assume that winning armies lose 3 % or 10 % of total manpower during battles (for campaigns with the goal to ‚destroy'). Losing armies lose between 10 % and 20 % of their force. For armies seeking to conquer a location, I followed a slightly more conservative measure than the first model by taking less than half of the ratios; assuming that armies lost between 1 % and 10 % of their total force. A victorious army lost between 1 % and 5 % of its force, while a defeated army lost either 2 % or 10 % of its force.
Given the different bounds and the range of losses during a campaign, we further segment the potential outcomes. If the medium army was a ‚lower-bound' medium army and thus had 1,500 homoioi, and it won, it could have lost 1 % or 5 % of its force. That yields two different outcomes: 10 men or 50 men lost. If we instead assume that the medium army was ‚upper-bound' or had 2,500 homoioi, and that it lost 1 % or 5 % of its manpower, it would have lost either 50 or 125 men. Thus, there are eight possible outcomes for medium army losses, and four possible outcomes for large army losses.
I multiply these outcomes by the number of conflicts fought sourced from the sample database presented above. Thus, a successful medium army has four potential outcomes which result from applying the ranges of losses (an unsuccessful medium army has another 4 outcomes). I therefore average all the outcomes such that each sample is counted but once. Thus, though a victorious medium-sized army yields four different outcomes, they are all averaged into one number. In that case, the average was 240 men lost.
Tab. 7: Number of homoioi lost in battle (model 2)
I show the paths of multiples above with both variables and with the actual results. One can follow the various segmentations: goal based, size, and segmentation within size. Below that is whether those armies were victorious or not, associated ratios of men lost, sample multiples sourced from the dataset, resulting losses, then averages of the resulting range of losses.
Step 1: Army Goal: was the goal to destroy an enemy army or to conquer a location?
Step 2: Army Size: was it a large or a medium sized army?
Step 3: ‚Upper or Lower Bound'; If it was a large army, it will be equivalent to 2,500 homoioi. If it was a medium army, it can be either a ‚lower bound' and have 1,500 or ‚upper bound' and have 2,500 homoioi.
Step 4: Defeat or Victory: Was the army victorious or not?
Step 5: Associated Losses: if it was victorious, it could have lost between 1 % or 5 % of men if the army sought to conquer a location. If it was defeated it could have lost 2 % to 10 % of its manpower. For an army seeking to destroy an enemy, if it was successful it could have lost 3 % or 10 % of its manpower, and if it was defeated 10 % or 20 % of its manpower.
Step 6: Sample Size: the number of samples of campaigns given the segmentations presented in the database.
Step 7: Segmented Losses: the outcome of all the different possible losses given varying conditions. Step 8: Average: the average losses to remove all double counting of samples, reducing the range of outcomes to one integer. Summing the averages results in 5,019 homoioi lost (tab. 7).
Amalgamated Models 1 and 2 and Additional Considerations
From the two methods, we are left with two possible average outcomes for the number of men Sparta lost during its voluntary campaigns: 3,466 or 5,019. These two numbers mean relatively little without placing them in the context of the homoioi population. As previously shown, Figueira's approximation for the number of homoioi between 20 and 49 years of age was the following (tab. 1): Over 210 years, these models suggest Sparta likely lost up to its entire population of males of military age due to warfare. It should however be noted that the majority of campaigns in the ‚population' of campaigns occur after 430 BC in connec-tion with Thucydides' and Xenophon's accounts. Below, I show the frequency of Spartan campaigns of the database used for Models 1 and 2 ( fig. 4) 
Fig. 4: Spartan campaign frequencies
In the dataset, 23/33, or 69 % data points occur after 430 BC, which coincides with the observed annualized decline of homoioi ( fig. 2) . Taking 69 % of the two possible number of deaths from Models 1 and 2 yields 2,392 and 3,463 homoioi deaths. As such, between 430 BC and 343 BC, 87 years, at least two thousand Spartans likely died in major conflicts. That's either 27 or 39 homoioi dead per year! Since the numbers of campaigns are spread relatively regularly after 430, we can compare these figures to the alleged Spartan population of military age. Below, I show the losses suffered by homoioi at war according to the two methods over the various time periods after 430 BC listed by Figueira. The total deaths are deaths a year multiplied by the number of years in the listed time period, such that for Method 1 (27 deaths a year) over the period between 425 and 418, 189 homoioi were lost (tab. 8). That Sparta lost at least 297 homoioi between 371 and 360 BC is not only believable but a low estimate: 400 homoioi were lost at Leuctra in 371 BC,59 and a further unknown but likely high number were lost at the battle of Mantinea in 362 BC.60 In a decade, about half of the available military manpower of Sparta was destroyed.
To these losses we must also consider the natural ‚exit rate' of surviving homoioi -the homoioi who survived and left the population of military age, and the ‚replenishment rate' of homoioi -the number of homoioi joining the ranks of the moirai. Following Figueira to model population age groups and mortality, we use The Male Mortality Level 4 of the ‚South' Populations in A. J. Coale and P Demeny (see Appendix, tables 3 and 4).61 For the sake of this argument, let us assume that the reproduction of Spartans is perfectly stable and not pressured downwards by structural factors, and balance one another at 37.03 per 1,000, rounded to 37.62 Let us also assume that these individuals survived and graduated from the paideia and the agôgê to join the population of military age. As a result, the total number of ‚replenishing' Spartans should maintain the variable population totals such that in both 425 BC and 418 BC, the population of military aged Spartans should be 2,755. Multiplying this total by 37/1000 for the replenishing 59 Xen. hell. VI.4.15. 60 Xen. hell. VII.5.23. 61 The "Male Mortality Level 4 of the ‚South' populations" in Coale -Demeny 1983, 450 . This life table is constructed from pre-20 th century southern Mediterranean populations. Infant mortality was high yet there was a relatively large portion of the total population aged above 50, making the table a reasonably good approximation of classical Greek populations. Figueira 1986, 169 notes the relatively low tracking error of the table. The natural life expectancy of the Ancient world is notoriously hard to measure, the only reliable data which does fit due to social and economic factors to the homoioi population is the Egyptian census data from the Roman era which suggests a natural death rate of about 42/1000. Osborne 2014, 42. 62 Coale -Demeny 1983, 450. rate, then again by seven, since there are seven years between 425 and 418, there should have been a replenishing force of about 700 Spartans. At the same time, a certain proportion of the moirai would depart due to age. Following the model table, in this instant almost 9 % of the moirai would depart the ranks of the 20-49 age groups over 7 years.63 The following are the total approximate replenishing and exiting Spartans (tab. 9).
Tab. 9: Homoioi replenishing and exiting

Period
Replenishing homoioi
Exiting Proportion
Exiting homoioi Result (Replenishing -Exiting) The total resulting populations are both slightly too high. Method 1 is clearly off by over 1,000 homoioi while Method 2 is only off by about 350 -suggesting that major defeats had enormous impacts on the population of homoioi. That they are 63 With a stable population, the population of Spartans between 42 and 49 years of age (and therefore the ones moving out of relevant age range) should be between those who are in the 40, 45, and 50-age segment. Halving the number between the 40 and 45 segment and adding the number in the 45-50 segment yields: 6.30/2 + 5.71 = 8.86 %. 64 In the figure displayed below, I subtract the losses from the population then add the replenishing population for each respective method.
both off implies that the losses applied may have been too conservative, that too few samples were found, or that choosing a stable population replenishment rate was too optimistic. It should however be noted that the 90 % confidence interval of Method 1 did include the reasonable possibility that 600 additional homoioi were lost overall, reducing the difference between the result from Method 1 and the actual observed population. In summation however, the resulting populations are actually quite close to the total populations found by Figueira, suggesting that battlefield losses are perhaps the most important factor in the diminishing Spartan population of homoioi; other factors, notably socioeconomic ones, would therefore be of secondary importance.
Limitations
This model is clearly not precise. An obvious limitation of this model is the changing composition of the Lacedaemonian army over time and over different campaigns, and whether or not homoioi were present in the numbers we included. For example, the Spartan army at Leuctra (371 BC) was previously cited as ‚large', yet clearly did not field either 1,750 or 2,500 homoioi. Further, the assumptions we have made about the number of homoioi in campaigns were sometimes subject to human error in the creation of the database and reliant upon the information from other individuals across time.65 I rely on the number of ways in which I was conservative in my estimates to offset these limitations. Those major conservative measures are the following: 1. Including only the lower bound of large armies. The army sent to fight against the Persians at Plataea in 479 BC would have been counted as an army of 2,500 homoioi rather than the 5,000 actually sent. 2. Human error: since it is easier to check if I double counted a campaign (by looking at the data and accompanying date) than it is to know that I omitted a campaign, human error would lead me to undercount campaigns and thus the associated losses. 3. I only include campaigns whose goals are to ‚destroy' and ‚conquer'. 4. Not including small armies in the model. 5. Using Peter Krentz' ratios, which apply to battles, not campaigns. A campaign must necessarily lead to equal or greater losses than a battle.
6. Not including fleets, which could have carried homoioi, specifically as officers. 7. Not applying a multiple to armies for wounds or diseases, which could claim a substantial number of men. This could be quite a massive source of loss. Dysentery killed between 5-50 % of ancient armies for example. There were a variety of diseases which could affect armies in the field such as Smallpox, Typhus, and Typhoid fever. Wounds killed off a large portion of the afflicted. Tetanus infections, gangrene, and septicemia would be incredibly deadly to wounded soldiers. In all likelihood gangrenous wounds produced about 100 % mortality.66 8. The original considerations for what constitutes a campaign, which was defined as a "voluntary, state-approved, armed expedition with a purpose, with a definite beginning and end". The key word is ‚voluntary', meaning that some conflicts were not included in the database when Sparta involuntarily fought, such as during some of the Theban invasions of the Peloponnese.
Model 3 Methodology
The previous two models sacrificed direct precision in favor of general results. Model 3 approaches the number of deaths from the other perspective, by using as much direct information as possible and limiting generalizations. Using the same ‚population' of campaigns outlined in Model 1 and 2 Methodology, I filter them further to only include campaigns including and after 479 BC because we can assume that Figueira's calculations are reasonably accurate. This additional filter yields a ‚sample population' of 28. Using Figueira's approximations as variable population bases, I calculate approximate sizes of armies over time. This approach contrasts to Model 1 and 2, in which the sizes of armies were fixed. More realistically therefore, in Model 3, the size of the citizen army in 479 BC is over twice as large as the size of the citizen army in 418 BC. Using Figueira's calculations is inherently safer than directly accepting the reported army provided by ancient writers because of the unclear nature of the changing composition of the moirai and the variable size of the total citizen army.67 66 For more information on diseases, infections, and wounds in ancient combat, see Gabriel 2007, Chapters 18-20. 67 On the changing composition of the moirai, see Toynbee 1913, 264-269; Toynbee 1969, 365-371; Cartledge 2000, 37-43; Hawkins 2011, 422-423; Figueira 1986, 175-187. I split the armies into small, medium, and large armies. In this model however, a large army is equal to the population (as determined by Figueira) that is between 20 and 49 years of age; a medium army is two thirds of that population, and a small army is one third of that population. As previously, a large army is demarcated in the display of the sample with a 3, a medium with a 2, and a small with a 1. The sample population of model 3 is the following (tab. 11): Model 3 thus suggests, along with Model 1 and 2 that the decline of the population of homoioi after 418 BC is highly correlated with combat deaths. Yet the population had been in decline before 418 BC, and Model 3 does not explain the precipitous fall (see fig. 1 ) from 5,000 homoioi in 479 BC to a little over 2,000 in 418 BC. Model 3 would suggest that the population should have dropped to 4,000 -not 2,000. There are several possible reasons for this shortcoming. First, that the Spartan earthquake of 464 BC wiped out a substantial portion of the population of homoioi. It is technically possible that among the many dead Lacedaemonians -20,000 according to Diodorus (XI.63.1), 10 % were homoioi, or that the long helot revolt claimed the lives of many homoioi which went unreported -understandably so as Sparta, a society already living in perpetual fear of foreigners, may have appeared weak in the wake of earthquake and revolt.71 The last piece of information they would want leaking to their rivals is the destruction of the citizen population at the hands of the helots. Perhaps Sparta's leadership adapted and accepted their diminished population, so that the idea that "Sparta's population recovered somewhat after the Earthquake/Revolt"72 was a mirage, a 71 French 1955, 112: "It must be admitted that the condition of Sparta at that time [during the revolt after the earthquake of 464] was one of such extreme peril that any straw was worth clutching at." French 1955, 115: "If this reconstruction is anything like correct it would mean that, in the years immediately following the earthquake, the position of Sparta was much more perilous than has been usually assumed, and that for that brief time she ceased to count in the councils of Greece." 72 Figueira 1986, 82 . possibility discussed by Hodkinson, especially with regard to long term trends in property ownership.73 A second possibility is that the information is simply missing. It does seem rather suspicious that there are decade-long gaps in the military history of Sparta when we rely on Herodotus' reports. Thirdly, perhaps the losses suffered by homoioi in involuntary campaigns, ravaging campaigns, supporting campaigns, and sea-based combat was quite large. The sample used in Model 3 is especially prone to this shortcoming due to its more stringent filters.
Missing from the sample are various important campaigns, especially during the Peloponnesian war -campaigns such as Pylos and Sphacteria in 425 BC, or the yearly ravages of the Attican peninsula during the ‚Archidamian War'. Fourth, the supposition that the population was replenishing itself at a stable rate (37/1000) is in fact incorrect. If this is true, then the structural fallacies previously discussed in the historiographical section at the beginning of this article account for the drop in replenishment and perhaps also caused the demotion from homoioi to hypomeiones for sections of the population of homoioi.
Implications and Conclusion
In summation, Model 1 and 2 strongly suggest that the population of homoioi was highly affected by the amalgam of battlefield losses. Model 3 supports that conclusion on the period of time following 418 BC. Any reduction in the ability to replenish the population, from infertility to inability to pay for mess contributions would push the estimated homoioi population lower -especially considering that the replenishment rate assumed a stable population. Further, deaths in battle would precipitate the effects of poverty due to inheritance, as the homoioi's assets are passed on to his wife or children -as was noted by Aristotle in "Politics".74 A final caveat to that argument is that Model 3 strongly suggests that battlefield deaths alone can account the diminishing population of homoioi after 418 BC, which includes the period of Spartan hegemony. Therefore, the roots of the structural economic fallacies must have contributed more to a diminishing population before 418 BC; in other words, the development of empire, with all the flows of precious metals, foreign influences, and other evils, may not have had enormous destructive effects upon the population of homoioi; this conclusion is consistent with the claims made by Hodkinson who already showed that the claims based on Plutarch's Agis -that Spartan society became corrupt after the Peloponnesian War in 404, and the traditional system of land tenure was destroyed by Epitadeus' law which introduced free gifts and bequest -was inconsistent with the evidence from all historical sources from the sixth through the fourth centuries and that such a narrative may be based on the 3 rd century revolutionary attempt to change the system of land tenure in Sparta by Agis IV and Cleomenes III.75 The absolute decline of the Spartan population from the Persian Wars to the end of the Peloponnesian War -6,000 (a total population around 8,000 to 2,000) -was far larger than the absolute decline suffered after the Peloponnesian War to Leuctra, of only about 1,000. The resulting population of homoioi was unable to maintain itself in the face of the seemingly perpetual conflicts facing it (see fig. 4 ).
I therefore conclude by restating my original claim: when seeking causes for oliganthrôpia, a normal, relatively small attrition rate on Spartan armies has a dramatic effect on the total population of homoioi. Further, if societal structure is partly to blame, the effects were perhaps more salient before the Peloponnesian war than during the ‚empire phase' of Sparta's history. 
